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NOTHING SEEMS "OBVIOUS" TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT, UNCHECKED BY THE SUPREME COURT,
TRANSFORMS THE STANDARD OF OBVIOUSNESS
UNDER THE PATENT LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 1, 1982, Congress established a new intermediate appel-
late court: the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC).' Over the last ten years the CAFC appears to have single-
handedly changed the standard of patentability created by the Constitu-
tion, codified by Congress and interpreted by the Supreme Court.2 Dur-
ing all the congressional debates concerning the creation of the CAFC,
there were no proposals for Congress to modify the Constitution and
create a federal court with the power to overrule the Supreme Court re-
garding issues of patent law, yet this is what is occurring.3 The Supreme
Court has remained silent while the CAFC has boldly redefined the crite-
ria used to determine whether an invention is patentable under the patent
law.
4
To obtain a patent, an invention must satisfy three statutory require-
ments: utility, novelty and obviousness.' The Supreme Court, Congress
and federal circuit courts have struggled to define obviousness since the
inception of the requirement in 1851.6 If an invention is "obvious" 7 to
1. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 402, 96 Stat. 25, 57
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988), 35 U.S.C. §§ 141-146 (1988)). Article III, Section 1 of
the Constitution grants Congress the authority to establish inferior courts. U.S. CONsT. art.
III, § 1.
2. See infra part IV.
3. See infra notes 40-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the congressional
debate on the formation of the CAFC. Promoters of the CAFC argued that the new court
would greatly relieve the Supreme Court from the strain of resolving intercircuit conflict con-
cerning the interpretation of patent law. See infra note 68 and accompanying text. However,
there was no indication in the debates that the CAFC would be a new Supreme Court with
respect to patent law. Creating a new Supreme Court would clearly violate Article III of the
Constitution. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
4. See infra part VI.
5. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory require-
ments that must be satisfied by an invention in order for the inventor to obtain a patent.
6. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
7. See infra note 85.
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those familiar with the "prior art,"8 the inventor cannot receive a patent 9
for the invention. 10
The government refuses to grant an inventor a patent for an obvious
invention because to do so would contradict United States patent policy.
Specifically, the government grants patent monopolies in order to foster
innovation and growth in the industry and sciences. 1 Granting an in-
ventor a seventeen-year monopoly for an invention that is obvious would
not encourage this growth and therefore would be inconsistent with the
government's goals.
1 2
Through its decisions over the last ten years, the CAFC has dramat-
ically reinterpreted the standard of obviousness. 3 Certain patents that
would have been invalid because they were obvious under the Supreme
Court's standard have been construed as valid under the CAFC's new
standard of obviousness.1 4 As a result, an inventor appealing a district
court's finding that his or her patent was void for obviousness is practi-
cally guaranteed that the CAFC will find the patent not obvious and
therefore valid.
This Comment explores the CAFC's impact on one requirement for
inventorship under United States patent law--obviousness.15 This Com-
ment also questions the CAFC's authority to change patent law in light
of contradictory United States Supreme Court decisions. Part II of this
Comment examines the historical development and purpose of the
CAFC.' 6 This examination reviews congressional intent and the con-
cerns of those in favor of and against creating this federal appellate court
with national jurisdiction. 7 Part III presents the development of the
8. "[Prior art includes any relevant knowledge, acts, descriptions and patents which per-
tain to, but pre-date, the invention in question." Mooney v. Brunswick Corp., 663 F.2d 724,
733 (7th Cir. 1981).
9. A patent is a grant of right to exclude others from making, using or selling one's
invention for seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
10. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirement of
obviousness. See also note 94 for a concrete application of the obviousness requirement.
11. Gustav Drews, The Patent Right in the National Economy of the United States, 33 J.
PAT. OFF. SOc'y 585, 610 (1951).
12. See infira notes 74-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the government's
purpose and policy in granting patent monopolies to inventors.
13. See infira notes 144-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the CAFC's interpre-
tation of the obviousness standard.
14. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
15. Many patent law authorities interchangeably refer to this as a requirement that an
invention be nonobvious or as a requirement of nonobviousness. To avoid confusion, this
Comment will generally refer to the requirement as one of obviousness.
16. See infra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 40-70 and accompanying text.
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policy that an invention may not receive a patent if it is found to be an
obvious invention. 18 Part IV examines CAFC decisions regarding obvi-
ousness-comparing and contrasting these decisions with prior Supreme
Court precedent. 19 This part also examines several factors that have in-
creased the CAFC's role and responsibility in creating and interpreting
patent law.20 Finally, this Comment recommends that the Congress and
Supreme Court recognize that the CAFC, in reinterpreting obviousness,
has changed the standard for patentability that was established by the
Supreme Court.21 To remedy this situation, the Supreme Court should
reassert its constitutional authority over the CAFC to validate and con-
firm United States patent law.22
II. CREATING THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Congressional leaders considered the creation of the CAFC as a ma-
jor step in judicial reform 23 because it provided a national, appellate fo-
rum in which to resolve patent disputes.24 Federal district courts have
original jurisdiction over cases involving patent law that would tradition-
ally be appealed to the circuit court in which the district resides.25 Con-
sistent with the effort to create a single appellate forum for patent cases,
Congress added § 1295 to Title 28 of the United States Code.26 Under
§ 1295, a party appealing a district court judgment in a patent case no
18. See infra part III.
19. See infra part IV.A-B.
20. See infra part IV.C-D.
21. See infra part V.
22. See infra part VI.
23. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1979) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on S. 677
and S. 678]. Judge Coffin, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, stated
that the bill to create the CAFC was "in the tradition of the three other major legislative
sources of the shape of the judicial establishment: the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Circuit Court
of Appeals Act of 1891, and the Judges' bill of 1925." Id. at 3 (statement of Frank M. Coffin,
C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit).
24. Importantly, this is only the second time the United States created a national court
based upon subject matter jurisdiction. See infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the lessons learned from the short-lived Commerce Court.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in
patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases." Id.
26. Federal Courts Improvement Act § 402. The CAFC shall have exclusive jurisdiction
over an appeal from a decision of "the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the Patent
and Trademark Office with respect to patent applications and interferences, at the instance of
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longer appeals to the circuit court for that district. The party appeals
directly to the CAFC.27
A. The Hruska Commission
Since 1887 Congress has debated over whether to create a single
court for patent appeals. 2  Most recently it addressed this issue in the
1970s, when experts noted the need to create national uniformity in cer-
tain areas of the law.2 9
In 1972 Congress created the Hruska Commission to study the en-
tire federal appellate court system and make recommendations for
change.30 The Hruska Commission determined that the federal appellate
court system's major problem was its inability to explicitly adjudicate
issues of national law." A significant consequence of this shortcoming
was an uncertainty in the law, which led parties to expensive forum shop-
ping among the circuits. 2 The Hruska Commission found that forum
an applicant for a patent or any party to a patent interference." 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A)
(1988).
In addition, the CAFC's exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over patent cases is pre-
served by providing the CAFC with jurisdiction over any appeal from decisions of district
courts. 35 U.S.C. §§ 145-146 (1988).
27. A party may appeal the CAFC's decision to the Supreme Court. However, the
Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari in patent cases. See infra note 73 and accompanying
text.
28. See generally Jack Q. Lever, Jr., The New Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (pt.
1), 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 178, 186-91 (1982) (discussing CAFC's legislative history, organiza-
tion, structure and jurisdiction). Congress first considered a special appeals court for patent
cases in 1887. Id. at 186 n.29. Between 1887 and 1921, 32 bills introduced in Congress in-
cluded provisions for the formation of a special court of appeals for jurisdiction over patent
cases. Id. Interest in a separate court for patent appeals was stimulated again in the 1930s, as
a result of the economic depression and the subsequent efforts to revive the economy. Id.
Congress considered nine separate bills on this subject between 1936 and 1951. Id.
29. The Freund Committee was appointed in 1971 by United States Supreme Court Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger. Id. at 187 n.31. The study group concluded that, due to an in-
creased workload, the Supreme Court was unable to carry out its job of resolving conflict-of-
law issues between the circuit courts. IaM
30. Id at 188. Congress created the Commission on the Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System (the Hruska Commission) in 1972. Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
489, 86 Stat. 807 (1972), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-420, 88 Stat. 1153 (1974). In addition to
other goals, the Hruska Commission was to "study the structure and internal procedures of
the Federal courts of appeal system." Id. The Hruska Commission's final report was titled
COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975) [hereinafter HRUSKA
COMMISSION REPORT], reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975).
31. Id. at 5-8, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. at 209-12.
32. Id. at 15, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. at 220.
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shopping was most intense in the area of patent law."3 As a result, the
Hruska Commission recommended the formation of a National Court of
Appeals, consisting of seven Article III judges, to decide issues of na-
tional importance.3 4
At the same time, the Hruska Commission reviewed the concept of
creating a specialized court strictly to hear patent appeals.3 5 The Hruska
Commission determined that specialized courts, however, had the fol-
lowing inherent disadvantages:
[1] [T]he quality of decision-making would suffer as the spe-
cialized judges become subject to "tunnel vision," seeing
the cases in a narrow perspective without the insights
stemming from broad exposure to legal problems in a vari-
ety of fields.
[2] Judges of a specialized court, given their continued expo-
sure to and great expertise in a single field of law, might
impose their own views of policy even where the scope of
review under the applicable law is supposed to be more
limited.
[3] Vesting exclusive jurisdiction over a class of cases in one
court might reduce the incentive, now fostered by the pos-
sibility that another court will pass on the same issue, to
produce a thorough and persuasive opinion in articulation
and support of a decision.
[4] [G]iving a national court exclusive jurisdiction over ap-
peals in a category of cases now heard by the circuit courts
would tend to dilute or eliminate regional influence in the
decision of those cases.
[5] [T]he advantages of decision-making by generalist judges
diminish as the judges' exposure to varied areas of law is
lessened.
[6] [T]he quality of appointments to a specialized court [is a
concern], not only because of the perceived difficulties in
finding truly able individuals who [are] willing to serve,
33. Id The Hruska Commission concluded that there were four major consequences of
the federal judicial system's inability to adjudicate issues of national law: (1). unresolved in-
tercircuit conflicts; (2) delay; (3) burden on the Supreme Court; and (4) uncertainty, even in
the absence of intercircuit conflict. Id. at 13-19, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. at 217-24. The prob-
lem of forum shopping in the field of patent law was confirmed by the Hruska Commission's
consultants, Professor James B. Gambrell and Mr. Donald R. Dunner, Esq. Id. at 15, re-
printed in 67 F.R.D. at 220.
34. Id. at vii, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. at 199.
35. Id. at 28, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. at 234.
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but also due to the fear that because the entire appoint-
ment process would operate at a low level of visibility,
particular seats or indeed the court as a whole may be
"captured" by special interest groups.36
Concerned with these disadvantages, the Hruska Commission rejected
the concept of creating a specialized court for patent appeals as an alter-
native to the proposed National Court of Appeals.
37
B. The Debate Over Creating the CAFC
The final form of the CAFC took shape in the Senate and the House
of Representatives through a series of bills considered in 197938 and
1981. 31 Proponents of the CAFC primarily argued that a single forum
such as the CAFC would reduce intercircuit conflict by fostering a uni-
form application of patent law.' ° Minor differences in interpretation of
law may be expected between circuit courts. These are often resolved
before the Supreme Court. With respect to patent law, however, experts
felt the differences in interpretation between each circuit were considera-
ble enough to encourage widespread forum shopping.41 Expert testi-
36. Id. at 28-30, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. at 234-36. While the Hruska Commission viewed
specialized courts with disfavor, other countries have viewed specialized courts favorably. For
example, both Japan and Germany use a specialized court to hear patent cases. See Lever,
supra note 28, at 190 n.38.
37. Id. at 30, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. at 236.
38. On March 15, 1979, the Senate introduced bills S. 677, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
and S. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See Lever, supra note 28, at 192. These bills were
never passed. Id. at 195.
39. The Senate introduced S. 21, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), on January 5, 1981, modi-
fied as S. 1700, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), and reported it favorably to the Senate on October
20, 1981. See S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981). The House introduced a corre-
sponding bill, H.R. 2405, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), on March 10, 1981, and favorably
reported it to the House as H.R. 4482, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), on November 4, 1981. See
H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981).
40. Different interpretations of patent law by each circuit allowed parties to characterize
certain circuits as "pro-patent" or "anti-patent." See H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 39, at 20.
Examples of intercircuit conflict in the area of patent law included differences between circuits
as to whether "synergism" had to exist before an invention was patentable, Addendum to
Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1979) [hereinafter Addendum to
Senate Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678] (statement of Donald R. Dunner, Esq.), and the require-
ment of certain circuits that combination inventions rise to a higher level of patentability than
other inventions, Senate Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678, supra note 23, at 114 (statement of
Howard T. Markey, C.J., Court of Claims and Patent Appeals).
41. Experts supporting the Hruska Commission's conclusions provided evidence from a
study of patent attorneys that intercircuit inconsistency encouraged forum shopping. Profes-
sor James B. Gambrell and Mr. Donald R. Dunner, Esq., of the Hruska Commission,
concluded:
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mony before Congress established that if one could bring an alleged
patent infringer before certain "pro-patent" circuits, the court would be
more likely to uphold the patent and determine that the opposing party
was guilty of infringement.a2 Conversely, an alleged patent infringer
could try to defend his or her case in an anti-patent circuit, thus increas-
ing the odds that the circuit court would invalidate the patent at issue
and not find the inventor guilty of patent infringement.4 3
Opponents of the CAFC argued that there was no serious conflict
between the circuit courts regarding patent law.' Further, opponents
argued that even if conflicts existed, they should be viewed as part of the
natural development of patent law 4  which the Supreme Court was ca-
pable of resolving.46 Finally, they argued that any intercircuit conflicts
regarding patent law were no different than conflicts concerning other
fields of law.47 Therefore, opponents concluded, patent law should not
be 'singled out for adjudication by a specialized tribunal, such as the
CAFC.4 8
Patentees now scramble to get into the 5th, 6th and 7th circuits since the courts there
are not inhospitable to patents whereas infringers scramble to get anywhere but in
these circuits. Such forum shopping not only increases litigation costs inordinately
and decreases one's ability to advise clients, it demeans the entire judicial process and
the patent system as well.
HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 30, at 152, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. at 370; see also I
PATENT PREPARATION & PROSECUTION PRACTICE 5-18 (Irving Kayton ed., 1983) (stating
that Eighth Circuit held every patent invalid from 1950 to 1970).
42. HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 30, at 152, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. at 370.
43. Id.
44. See Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-1981: Hearings on H.R. 2405 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1981) [hereinafter House Hearings on H.R. 2405]
(statement of Sidney Neuman on behalf of Committee to Preserve the Patent Jurisdiction of
the United States Courts of Appeal).
45. The argument against the CAFC was stated as follows: "[The v]ariety of views devel-
oped in different circuits on various points produce review by the Supreme Court and growth
in the law; absent opportunity for diversity of views the law will stagnate and rigidify, raising
the question whether any case would get to the Supreme Court." Hearings on H.R. 6933, H.R.
6934, HR. 3806 and H.R. 2414 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin-
istration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 763, 771 (1980)
(statement of George W. Whitney on behalf of American Bar Association).
46. House Hearings on HR. 2405, supra note 44, at 250 (statement of J. Philip Anderegg).
47. Id. at 251 (statement of J. Philip Anderegg).
48. See iL at 114, 124 (statement of Sidney Neuman on behalf of Committee to Preserve
the Patent Jurisdiction of the United States Courts of Appeal).
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C. The Concern With Forming a Specialized Court
Opponents argued against forming the CAFC based on the two
traditional arguments against specialized courts. 4 9 The opponents' first
objection was that judges on a specialized court could develop "tunnel
vision" and pursue policies at odds with those goals advanced by the
general law.50 As a result, a specialized court could become "pro-pat-
ent" or "anti-patent," as had certain of its sister circuits before it.5 1 De-
cisions of a pro-patent or anti-patent CAFC would have a more serious
impact on the national economy than decisions of a single circuit court
because the CAFC would have decision-making authority over all patent
law appeals.
The second objection to specialized courts concerned the possibility
that those repeatedly before the court would develop undue influence
over the court." This had been a problem in the past. Congress created
a national appellate court with singular subject matter jurisdiction only
once before,53 in 1910 when it created the Commerce Court.5 4 Congress
created the Commerce Court to hear appeals from the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) at a crucial time in the development of U.S.
railroads.5 The Commerce Court was abolished by Congress after only
three years.56 The Commerce Court's demise in 1913 was attributed to
two major factors: (1) The court did not have the support of the major
parties involved in the resolution of railroad issues; and (2) the court
lacked the "judicial insulation" that traditionally shields federal courts
from institutional attack. 7 The Commerce Court could do little to en-
dear itself to the railroad interests because they were already comfortable
with the ICC's oversight.5 8 At the same time, the ICC stood opposed to
49. See Addendum to Senate Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678, supra note 40, at 31 (state-
ment of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney General, Office for Improvements in the Ad-
ministration of Justice).
50. Id (statement of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney General, Office for Improve-
ments in the Administration of Justice).
51. See H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1981).
52. See Addendum to Senate Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678, supra note 40, at 31 (state-
ment of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney General, Office for Improvements in the Ad-
ministration of Justice).
53. Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, § 1, 36 Stat. 539, 539-42 (1910) (repealed 1913).
54. I d; George E. Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study In Institutional Weak-
ness, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 238, 239 (1964). The Commerce Court was abolished in October
1913. Id.
55. Dix, supra note 54, at 239.
56. Id
57. Id
58. Id. at 244-45.
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a judicial body extending its influence over issues that the ICC consid-
ered within its own exclusive jurisdiction.59
Even lacking the support of its major participants, the ICC and the
railroads, the Commerce Court might have survived had it developed the
judicial insulation commensurate with its position as a federal court.'
Unfortunately, the Commerce Court failed to generate the respect that a
federal court needs in order to endure unpopular decisions, largely be-
cause it resembled an administrative agency instead of a federal court.61
Critics also attacked the Commerce Court for its expanded scope of ap-
pellate review.62 In reviewing the ICC's decisions, the Commerce Court
often reconsidered questions of fact found by the ICC6 3-a task in which
appellate courts normally do not engage unless reviewing findings of fact
that are "clearly erroneous. ' 64
The Commerce Court also lacked judicial insulation because of the
public perception that it failed to integrate itself into the federal court
structure.65 The primary factor in this regard was the court's narrow
subject matter jurisdiction.66 Thus, viewed as little more than an admin-
istrative agency, instead of a venerable federal court, the Commerce
Court lacked the judicial insulation needed to protect it from opponents
and was abolished in less than three years.67
D. The Formation of the CAFC Would Unify Patent Law Without the
Supreme Court's Intervention
Supporters proclaimed that the CAFC would eliminate intercircuit
conflicts regarding patent law while avoiding the need to expend the
Supreme Court's valuable and limited time.68 At the same time, many
proponents of the CAFC did not want to foreclose the Supreme Court
59. Id. at 241-42.
60. Id. at 253-54.
61. Id. at 255-57. For example, Congress limited Commerce Court judges to a five-year
term of appointment, as opposed to the life tenure granted to Article III judges under the
Constitution. Id. at 255.
62. Id at 256.
63. Id
64. See FED. RL Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee's note accompanying 1985 amendment.
65. See Dix, supra note 54, at 257.
66. Id.
67. Id at 239.
68. Inaugural Special Session of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
686 F.2d LX, LXIV (1982) [hereinafter Inaugural of the CAFC] (statement of Edward C.
Schmults, Deputy U.S. Attorney General, that reducing intercircuit conflicts will reduce pres-
sure on United States Supreme Court to reduce such conflicts); Addendum to Senate Hearings
on S. 677 and S. 678, supra note 40, at 54 (statement of Donald R. Dunner, that intercircuit
conflicts have not been alleviated by the Supreme Court partly because the Court has insuffi-
January 1993]
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from hearing patent law issues. Proponents assumed that the Supreme
Court would continue to serve as the final arbiter to prevent or correct
CAFC misinterpretations of patent law.69 Strongly in favor of forming
the CAFC to bypass Supreme Court intervention in developing patent
law, however, Congressman Robert McClory, the CAFC's major sup-
porter in the House of Representatives, ominously stated that the new
CAFC "may... represent the court of last resort" in patent law cases.70
President Reagan signed Senate bill 1700 into law on April 2, 1982, offi-
cially creating the CAFC.71
A detailed analysis of the patent cases heard by the Supreme Court
from 1952 to 1992 is required in order to compare the Supreme Court's
involvement in the development of patent law before and after the forma-
tion of the CAFC.72 From a partial survey, it seems that the number of
patent cases heard by the Supreme Court has sharply diminished in the
past ten years since the CAFC's formation. 73 This survey indicates that
the CAFC is well on its way to fulfilling Congress's goal of unifying pat-
ent law without the Supreme Court's intervention.
cient time and partly because the Court has spoken inconsistently in resolving patent law
disputes).
69. The American Patent Law Association (APLA) stated: "The Supreme Court will re-
view cases on petitions for certiorari from the new Federal Circuit Court .... ." House Hear-
ings on H.R. 2405, supra note 44, at 57 (statement of J. Jancin, Jr., President, APLA).
70. Inaugural Session of the CA4FC, supra note 68, at LXVI (statement of Rep. McClory).
During the inauguration of the CAFC, Congressman Robert McClory stated: "I might ven-
ture that since the Supreme Court has been able to entertain review of very few patent cases
over the past 25 years, the new appeals court may well, in most respects, represent the court of
last resort in patent cases." Id. (statement of Rep. McClory).
71. See Federal Courts Improvement Act, 96 Stat. at 58.
72. The scope of this Comment does not permit an original compilation of the necessary
statistics comparing the number of patent cases considered by the Supreme Court from 1952 to
1982 with the number of patent cases considered by the Supreme Court from 1982 to 1992.
73. The Supreme Court has heard only two patent law cases since Congress formed the
CAFC in 1982. The Supreme Court heard the first case, Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp.,
475 U.S. 809 (1986), only to ask the CAFC to explain its policy of performing supplemental
fact finding regarding the issue of obviousness. Id. at 811. The CAFC explained its policy,
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the subsequent appeal. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison
Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987). In the only other
patent law case heard by the Supreme Court since the formation of the CAFC, the Court's
opinion discussed patent law history, theory and policy in great detail. Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). Arguably, the Court wanted to remind the
legal community that, although absent from the field of patent law for some duration, the
Court remained involved in patent law jurisprudence. See id.
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III. PATENT LAW AND OBVIOUSNESS
A. Patent Law
United States patent law was derived from English patent law.74
Patents were authorized by statute in England in 1624 by the Statute of
Monopolies.75 The Statute of Monopolies provided a fourteen-year mo-
nopoly for" 'the sole working or making of any manner of new manufac-
ture within this realm.' "76 The fact that English patent law was based
on methods of "new manufacture" indicates that the goal of the English
patent system was the introduction and development of new
technology.7
Similarly, the United States Constitution fosters the development of
new technology by giving Congress the power to promote the progress of
the useful arts by granting inventors the exclusive right to their discover-
ies for a limited time.78 Congress first exercised its constitutional power
to grant exclusive rights to inventors in 1790, when it authorized the
issuance of patents to inventors.
7 9
A patent confers on its owner the right to "exclude others from
making, using, or selling the [patented] invention throughout the United
States" for the life of the patent."' Patents provide an important incen-
tive for people to disclose their inventions because an inventor can only
receive the patent monopoly through public disclosure of the invention to
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.8 ' Public disclosure of an inven-
tion, in turn, may inspire others to create and make further technological
breakthroughs that benefit society. One of the earliest patents was
74. Karl B. Lutz, Are the Courts Carrying Out Constitutional Public Policy on Patents?, 34
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 766, 768 (1952).
75. Id. at 770.
76. Id. at 768.
77. Id at 770.
78. The Constitution gives Congress the power "to promote the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
79. See 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 48,
at 76 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1890). The importance of patents to the new nation is
perhaps best exhibited by the composition of the first patent board. The first patent board
consisted bf the Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, the Secretary of War, Henry Knox, and
the Attorney General, Edmund Randolph. PHARMACEUTICAL MFRS. AsS'N, THE STORY OF
THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE 1 (1965).
80. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
81. See I PATENT PREPARATION & PROSECUTION PRACTICE, supra note 41, at 1-3, 1-4
regarding the process whereby the inventor may publicly disclose the nature and details of his
or her invention through a patent in exchange for the government's grant of a time-limited
monopoly over the invention.
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granted to Abraham Lincoln, who stated: "'The patent system added
the fuel of interest to the fire of genius.' "82
B. Obviousness
An applicant must fulfill three statutory requirements to obtain a
patent for an invention. First, the applicant must show the invention is
useful.83 Second, the applicant must demonstrate the invention is new
and that he or she is the first person to invent it. 4 Third, the applicant
must prove that the invention represents a significant advance over the
prior art. This requirement, known as obviousness,8" demands that the
invention not be obvious. An invention may be obvious if it is found to
be similar to previous inventions or if it is found to be similar to proposed
inventions disclosed in journal articles, sales brochures or virtually any
other medium.
Of these three requirements, the most difficult to satisfy is obvi-
ousness because obviousness measures the extent of the technological ad-
82. See P RmACEuTICAL MFRs. Ass'N, supra note 79, at 10-11 (quoting Abraham Lin-
coin at 1859 lecture in Springfield, Ill.). Abraham Lincoln received U.S. Patent No. 6469 for a
design that allowed a riverboat to navigate over the shoals. Id. at 11.
83. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) states:
INVENTIONS PATENTABLE
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Id
84. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) states in part:
CONDITIONS FOR PATENTABILITY; NOVELTY AND LOSS OF RIGHT TO PATENT
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country .... more than one year lrior to the date of the application for patent
in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this coun-
try by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.
Id.
85. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) reads in pertinent part:
CONDITIONS FOR PATENTABILITY; NON-OBVIOUS SUBJECT MATTER
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject mat-
ter.., as a whole would have been obvious.., to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by
the manner in which the invention was made.
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Vance embodied in the invention. 6 The Supreme Court and Congress
have struggled to define obviousness since the inception of the require-
ment in 1851.87
1. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court established the requirement for obviousness in
1851 in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.88 The patent in Hotchkiss disclosed an
improved method of making knobs for "locks, doors, cabinet furniture,
and for all other purposes for which wood and metal, or other material
knobs, are used." 9 This improvement simply consisted of making knobs
of the same design as before but using potter's clay instead of wood or
metal.9" Justice Nelson, writing for the Court, said that even though the
knobs were better because of the new material, the knobs were not pat-
entable because "the peculiar effect ... is not distinguishable from that
which would exist in the case of the wood knob,... or of other materials
that might be mentioned" in the patent claims."
Justice Nelson did, however, say that the knob might be patentable,
even though there was no new principle or effect, if "more ingenuity and
skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were
required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were
possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business."92 In
this case, however, the Court held the patent void because it lacked the
"skill and ingenuity" that are essential to every patentable invention.9"
The Court thus provided itself with a new means to limit the patentabil-
ity of an invention.94
86. See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 3.1, at 32 (2d ed.
1988) (classifying utility and novelty as mere formal prerequisites to obviousness inquiry);
Robert W. Harris, Prospects for Supreme Court Review of the Federal Circuit Standards for
Obviousness of Inventions Combining Old Elements, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 66,
66 (1986) (stating that obviousness standards are most important test in patent law because
"obviousness is the most frequently dispositive patentability issue, sinlde most inventions can
meet the comparatively liberal requirements of utility and novelty").
87. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 249.
90. Id. at 265.
91. Id. at 267.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874). An early example in
which the Supreme Court applied this new means to limit patentability involved the common
pencil with attached eraser. In 1874 the Supreme Court determined that the patent for a
pencil with attached eraser was void due to obviousness. Permanently attaching an eraser to a
pencil was a good idea, the Court conceded, but the Court held the device unpatentable be-
cause it incorporated nothing new. Id at 507.
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The Supreme Court began to use the mechanism it created in Hotch-
kiss to limit the patentability of inventions late in the 1800s. 95 Relying
on its decision in Atlantic Works v. Brady,96 the Supreme Court con-
firmed in 1885 that there must be an element of "invention" in a new
device for it to be patentable.97 In 1886 a district court cited Hotchkiss
for the proposition that "[n]ot every trifling device, nor any obvious im-
provement in the material already possessed, is intended to be rewarded"
by the patent laws.9" In this period the Supreme Court upheld only two
out of more than three dozen patents that came before it.9 9
The Supreme Court's efforts to limit patentability peaked during the
period from the 1930s to the 1950s in what patent authorities refer to as
the "hostile" Supreme Court decisions.l °° The two most notorious of
these cases were Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp. 101
and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp. 102
In Cuno Engineering the Court conceded that the invention, an electric
cigar lighter for use in automobiles, performed a new and useful func-
tion."0 3 However, regardless of a new device's utility, the Court stated
95. See, e.g., Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1 (1885). The Court stated that "it is not
enough that a thing shall be new, . . . and that it shall be useful, but it must, under the
constitution and the statute, amount to an invention or discovery." Id. at 11.
After the Civil War there was a sharp rise in the number of patents issued by the Patent
Office, primarily because the United States was entering the Industrial Revolution. See PHAR-
MACEUTICAL MFRS. ASS'N, supra note 79, at 34. In 1860 the Patent Office issued 4357 pat-
ents. The number jumped to 8863 in 1866 and 12,277 in 1867. The number of patents issued
annually rose to about 20,000 by 1883. This phenomenal increase stood in sharp contrast to
the 883 patents issued at the time the Supreme Court decided Hotchkiss in 1851. Id.; see also
Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co- New Standards for Patents, 49 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 237, 270 (1967) (explaining that sharp increase in patent litigation followed explosion in
number of patents issued).
The Supreme Court seems to have feared that the Patent Office was granting patents too
easily and began looking for a way to more sharply define, and perhaps limit, what was patent-
able. For example, the Court stated in Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883):
It was never the object of... [patent] laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling
device, every shadow of a shade of an idea .... Such an indiscriminate creation of
exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate invention. It creates a
class of speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the advancing wave
of improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which en-
able them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without contributing
anything to the real advancement of the art.
Id.
96. 107 U.S. 192 (1883).
97. Id. at 200.
98. Leonard v. Lovell, 29 F. 310, 314 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1886).
99. 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENis § 5.02[1], at 5-16 n.28 (rev. ed. 1990).
100. See Kitch, supra note 95, at 240 n.21.
101. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
102. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
103. 314 U.S. at 90.
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that in order to qualify for a U.S. patent an invention's manufacture must
reveal "the flash of creative genius," not merely the normal skill in the
relevant technology. 1° 4 Seemingly, under the Court's increasingly sub-
jective and anti-patent standard, a group of rocket scientists methodically
designing and building the Space Shuttle over a ten-year period would
not qualify for a patent if the Court failed to discern a "flash of creative
genius" in its creation!10 5
The Court further expanded its subjective view of patentability in
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 106 Justice Douglas, in a concurring
opinion, stated that the invention of a new and useful grocery checkout
stand did not qualify for a patent and that it should be added to the "list
of incredible patents" approved by the Patent Office.107 In Justice Doug-
las's view, in order to qualify for a patent, an invention should "serve the
ends of science-to push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics and the
like; to make a distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge." ' Jus-
tice Douglas referred to this as the "inventive genius" test.10 9 Justice
Douglas went so far as to demand that only those inventions recognized
by the appropriate "masters of the scientific field" to which the invention
belonged should properly qualify for a patent.110 Essentially, Justice
Douglas would not grant a patent for the Space Shuttle unless some un-
defined "masters" in the aerospace community recognized the Space
Shuttle as advancing the scientific frontier.
2. Congress codified obviousness
Congress sharply curtailed the increasingly subjective, anti-patent
sympathies of the Supreme Court with the Patent Act of 1952.111 Con-
104. IAt at 91.
105. Describing the Supreme Court's general disdain for patents, Justice Jackson pro-
claimed: "But I doubt that the remedy for such Patent Office passion for granting patents is an
equally strong passion in this Court for striking them down so that the only patent that is valid
is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on." Jungerson v. Ostby & Barton
Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
106. In Great AtL & Paa Tea Co. the Supreme Court reversed the district court and the
court of appeals, deciding that the patent for an improved way to move groceries on a cashier's
counter was invalid. 340 U.S. at 149.
107. Id. at 158 (Douglas, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 154 (Douglas, J., concurring).
109. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 155 (Douglas, J., concurring).
111. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 35 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. I 1990)).
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gress specifically enacted 35 U.S.C. § 103 to define obviousness and elim-
inate the Supreme Court's subjective "flash of genius" test.'
12
The Supreme Court acted very cautiously in interpreting 35 U.S.C.
§ 103. It was not until 1966, fourteen years after enactment, that the
Court first agreed to hear the issue of obviousness under § 103.113 When
the Supreme Court finally spoke, however, it did so with great delibera-
tion and provided a distinct standard to follow.
In interpreting § 103, the Supreme Court developed a three-part test
for obviousness as a matter of law in Graham v. John Deere Co.,114 which
was decided in consolidation with Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co.
and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chemical Co. 115 Before interpreting
the new § 103, however, the Court stated that § 103 was "merely ... a
codification of judicial precedents" that embraced its prior obviousness
decisions.116 As a result, the Supreme Court treated its earlier decisions
regarding patentability, such as its decision in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,'
17
as valid precedent.
The Supreme Court then articulated the type of factual inquiries
that courts must undertake in evaluating obviousness:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at
issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obvi-
ousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is
detemined. 118
112. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). See supra note 85 for the pertinent text of 35 U.S.C. § 103.
The congressional notes accompanying the addition of § 103 stated that the purpose of the
section was to "have some stabilizing effect, and also to serve as a basis for the addition at a
later time of some criteria which may be worked out" with respect to obviousness. 35
U.S.C.A. § 103 historical revision & notes (West 1984). Congress added the last sentence of
§ 103 specifically to eliminate the Supreme Court's "flash of genius" test, stating: "The second
sentence [of § 103] states that patentability as to this requirement is not to be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made, that is, it is immaterial whether it resulted from long
toil and experimentation or from a flash of genius." Id.; see also 1 PATENT PREPARATION &
PROSECUTION PRACTICE, supra note 41, at 5-33 (stating that last sentence of § 103 was meant
to eliminate "flash of genius" test).
113. The Court first interpreted § 103 in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
114. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). Graham involved the validity of a patent for a spring clamp that
"permitted plow shanks to be pushed upward when they hit obstructions in the soil" and then
returned to their original plowing position once past the obstruction in the soil. Id. at 19-20.
115. Id. at 1.
116. Id at 17. "We believe that this legislative history, as well as other sources, shows that
the [new § 103] was not intended by Congress to change the general level of patentable inven-
tion." Id (footnote omitted).
117. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
118. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
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Against this three-part factual inquiry, the Supreme Court recommended
that courts examine "secondary considerations" such as "commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., ... to give
light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter
sought to be patented." 119
Although the Court applied this new test to the facts in the primary
case in Graham, it neglected to discuss secondary considerations.120 The
Court held the patent at issue invalid because the small improvement
would have been obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the relevant
art.
12 1
In the consolidated case involving Cook Chemical, the Court ex-
amined a patent case with respect to the secondary considerations.
1 22
The patent at issue involved an invention for a shipper-sprayer that
sealed pump spray tops of household liquid products during shipping.
1 23
This device allowed liquid products to be shipped without leaking, while
at the same time protecting the sprayer. 24 The Court first examined the
patent for the device using the three-part test and determined the patent
was obvious based on the prior art regarding existing shipper-sprayers. 125
The Court then proceeded to examine the secondary considerations, such
as the long felt need in the industry for this particular design of a ship-
per-sprayer, the failure of others to produce a successful device and com-
mercial success.1 26 After doing so the Court invalidated the patent,
stating that the patent was clearly obvious because of the prior art analy-
sis and that secondary considerations alone were insufficient to "tip the
scales of patentability."' 27 The Court's holding indicated that secondary
considerations were of minor importance in any test for obviousness.
1 28
119. Id at 17-18.
120. See id. at 19-24.
121. Id at 24-26.
122. Id at 26.
123. Id at 26-27.
124. Id. at 27.
125. Id at 30-35.
126. Id. at 29, 35-36. The district court held the patent valid based on secondary considera-
tions. See Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., 220 F. Supp. 414,420-21 (W.D. Mo. 1963), aff'd,
336 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1964), rev'd sub norm. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
The court of appeals affirmed using a similar rationale. See Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co.,
336 F.2d 110, 113-14 (8th Cir. 1964), rev'd sub norm. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1
(1966).
127. Graham, 383 U.S. at 36-37.
128. Id. at 36. The Supreme Court also applied the Graham approach in United States v.
Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966). Adams was decided the same day as Graham. The Court dis-
cussed the probative value of secondary considerations such as industry expert opinion that the
January 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:455
After Congress implemented § 103, the Supreme Court first dis-
cussed the standard of obviousness in "combination patents" 2 9 in Ander-
son's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co. 130 Anderson's-Black
Rock involved a patent for a machine that combined an asphalt spreader
with a heating element that improved the manner in which new asphalt
bonded with the old asphalt. 131 Applying asphalt with earlier machines
resulted in bonding problems.1 32 The new combination machine was a
commercial success because it significantly improved asphalt bonding by
use of simultaneous spreading and heating.
1 33
The Court cited Graham in Anderson's-Black Rock,'34 but never
reached a formal conclusion with respect to obviousness using the Gra-
ham standard. 35 Instead, the Court analyzed the combination patent
for obviousness using the standard developed by a line of decisions made
before the enactment of § 103, which required a "synergistic" result. 36
Under this line of reasoning, an invention consisting of a combination of
existing elements was obvious and therefore unpatentable, unless it pro-
duced a synergistic effect.' 37 Because the Court found that the new pav-
ing system had no synergistic effect, the Court decided the patent was
invalid. 138
Seven years later, in Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., the Court examined
another combination patent with identical results.' 39 The Court con-
cluded that the improved cleaning effects of a combination patent did not
rise to the level of synergy because each element of the system performed
device at issue was not likely to work. However, there was no indication that the Court de-
voted much weight to these considerations. Id. at 52.
129. See 2 CHISUM, supra note 99, § 5.04[5]. Professor Chisum describes a "combination
patent" as covering an invention consisting of a combination of old components, each of which
standing alone is not patentable. Such patents usually involve mechanical devices that com-
bine old elements in a new way such that it is patentable as a unique invention. Id. § 5.04[5],
at 5-286.
130. 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
131. Id at 58-59.
132. Id at 58.
133. Id. at 61.
134. Id. at 61-62 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
135. See id. at 62.
136. Id at 61. Synergy is created when combined elements produce total effects greater
than the sum of each individual element. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip.
Co., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950).
137. Anderson's-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 60-62.
138. Id. at 62-63:
139. 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
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exactly the same function as it had in the prior art." The Sakraida
Court ignored the secondary considerations of commercial success and
invalidated the patent although the invention was "doubtless a matter of
great convenience, producing a desired result in a cheaper and faster
way, and enjoying commercial success."141
As a result, the Court established that combination patents must be
analyzed for obviousness under a separate standard-a combination pat-
ent must show synergistic effects in order to avoid obviousness.142 Thus,
in evaluating the claimed invention, the Court ignored the Graham stan-
dard of obviousness and applied a stricter standard to determine the va-
lidity of combination patents. 143
IV. THE CAFC CREATES A NEW OBvioUSNESS STANDARD
As discussed above, one of the CAFC's primary tasks was to create
a uniform interpretation of patent law. 1" In an effort to accomplish this
goal, the CAFC held that a number of district courts had erred in requir-
ing proof of synergistic effects in order for combination patents to be
nonobvious.
A. Eradication of the Synergy Requirement
In Chore-Time Equipment, Inc. v. Cumberland Corp. ,145 the CAFC
stated in dicta that it did not view synergism as a requirement for patent-
ability in combination patent cases. 146 The invention at issue in Chore-
Time Equipment combined two known elements into a single device for
feeding chickens.147 The CAFC, apparently ignoring the Supreme
Court's holdings in Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.
140. Id. at 282. The patent at issue was for a device that released a sheet of water directly
onto a barn floor to wash all animal waste into drains, thus cleaning the barn floor without any
supplemental labor. Id. at 277.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Not only did the Court cite and then ignore Graham, it specifically found that the
appellate court-which had applied the three-part Graham test--"erroneously set aside the
District Court's findings." Id. at 280. Then, the Court conducted an "independent examina-
tion" of the patentability of the invention. Id. Focusing on whether the claimed invention
"produce[d] a 'new or different function' ... within the test of validity of combination pat-
ents," the Court found the invention obvious under the "synergism" test. Id. at 280, 282
(quoting Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60 (1969)).
144. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
145. 713 F.2d 774 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The district court granted summary judgment, holding
that the subject matter of patent claims one, three and seven would have been obvious under
§ 103. Id. at 775. The CAFC affirmed. Id. at 780.
146. Id. at 781.
147. Id. at 775-78.
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and' Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.,148 posited that the "requirement that an
invention reflect 'synergism' or achieve a 'synergistic result,' before it
may be held patentable appears nowhere in the statute .... References to
synergism as a patentability requirement are, therefore, unnecessary and
confusing."149 The CAFC nonetheless affirmed the district court's hold-
ing that the invention was obvious based upon Graham's three-part test,
concluding that the holding did not rely on the premise that synergy is
required for an invention to be nonobvious. 1
50
The CAFC soon transformed the dicta in Chore-Time Equipment
into law in a series of cases involving combination patents.'-" In none of
these cases did the CAFC follow the Supreme Court's earlier require-
ment that a combination exhibit synergy or be invalidated due to
obviousness.
Emphasizing that it did not recognize a special standard for combi-
nation patents, the CAFC stated in Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp. 152
that "[a] requirement for 'synergism'... is nowhere found in the stat-
ute." 1 53 The court stated that the division of patents into categories,
such as "combination patents," was unwarranted and that "[r]eference to
'combination' patents is... meaningless [because] virtually all patents
... describe.., inventions formed of a combination of elements." 1" 4
Next, in American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons ... the CAFC
stated that a jury instruction was "wholly erroneous" because it required
a showing of synergism in order for a combination patent to be nonobvi-
ous.1 56 Indeed, the court explicitly rejected synergism as a requirement
148. See supra notes 130-42 and accompanying text.
149. Chore-Time Equip., 713 F.2d at 781 (citation omitted).
150. Id.
151. See, eg., Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Ameri-
can Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821
(1984); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
152. 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
153. Id at 1540 (citation omitted). The district court declared that the defendant's patent
claims one, three, four, six and seven, relating to "tubing used in the aircraft and missile indus-
try," were invalid owing to obviousness under § 103. Id. at 1531, 1540. Although the district
court made findings of fact with respect to secondary considerations, the CAFC complained
that the district court was not thorough in its investigation of secondary considerations. Id. at
1538-39. The CAFC stated that "a court must not stop until all pieces of evidence [of secon-
dary considerations] have been fully considered and each has been given its appropriate
weight." Id. This case is an excellent example of how the CAFC loosely interpreted the facts
and weight of secondary considerations to ensure its desired result with respect to obviousness.
154. Id at 1540.
155. 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
156. Id at 1360. The jury instruction stated:
You must next determine whether the differences between plaintiff's claimed inven-
tion and the prior art, if any, and as you have found them to be, produce a new and
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for patentability in combination patents.157 The CAFC based its decision
on "predecessor courts," citing earlier Circuit Court of Patent Appeals
(CCPA) and circuit courts of appeals decisions."5 8 Thus, it appears that
the CAFC believed it was not constrained within the bounds of Supreme
Court precedent regarding combination patents.
In Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Fell,'5 9 the CAFC unequivocally
addressed the patentability of inventions comprised of combinations of
prior art. Refining the "suggestion test,"' 16 the court made it clear that
secondary considerations must be evaluated in determining the obvi-
ousness of combination patents.'
6 1
Under the suggestion test, an invention consisting of a combination
of prior art is obvious only if it is shown that the prior art suggested
making the new combination.' 62 On the one hand, if the prior art sug-
gested a new invention, the developer of the prior art undoubtedly would
have ified for a patent. The resulting effect is that prior art rarely sug-
gests a "new" combination because an inventor would most likely have
patented any "new" combination. Therefore, through its suggestion test,
unexpected result. That is, you must determine whether the elements making up
plaintiff's claimed invention combine so as to perform in some way or manner, a new
and unexpected function in combination than they perform separately. The reason
for this is that a patented invention which unites only old elements without produc-
ing either a new and unexpected result merely withdraws from the public's use that
which was known before.
Id.
157. Id. at 1360-61.
158. Id.
159. 774 F.2d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
160. See, eg., ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Mdntefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1984) ("Obviousness cannot be established by combining the teachings of prior art to produce
the claimed invention absent some... suggestion supporting the combination." (emphasis
added) (citations omitted)); Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Der-
rick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that patent which relied on "combina-
tion of features used in separate devices" is not necessarily obvious because solution in patent
at issue was not suggested by prior devices, "alone or together").
161. The district court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff, Interconnect Plan-
ning, stating that its patent for a multi-station telephone switching system was invalid due to
obviousness under § 103. Interconnect Planning, 774 F.2d at 1134. The CAFC reversed and
remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Id. at 1144. Even though it analyzed
secondary considerations in the findings below, the district court ignored them, having already
found the patent obvious. Id. In response, the CAFC remanded the case and admonished the
district court to ensure that evidence of secondary considerations "be considered and afforded
appropriate weight." Id
162. The CAFC vacated the summary judgment, reasoning that the district court could
only find obviousness if" 'something in the prior art as a whole... suggest[ed] the desirability,
and thus the obviousness, of making the combination."' Id at 1143 (quoting Lindemann
Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1462 (Fed. Cir.
1984)).
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the CAFC effectively ensured it would rarely find patents for new combi-
nations of prior art obvious.
163
Thus, in sharp contrast to the Supreme Court's stringent standards
for determining the patentability of combination patents, the CAFC de-
veloped a comparatively lenient obviousness standard for combination
patents."6 By breaking down the Supreme Court's artificial barriers
denoting different classes of patents, the CAFC may evaluate obvi-
ousness for all patents using a single standard-the Graham standard.
161
Although convenient, and arguably accurate, the CAFC improperly cre-
ated new law in the face of prior Supreme Court rulings.1 66
B. The CAFC and Grahams Secondary Considerations
In Graham v. John Deere Co. 167 the Supreme Court established a
three-part test for courts to use to determine obviousness.1 6 The Court
also stated that secondary considerations "may have relevancy" 169 in de-
termining obviousness. The CAFC, however, applies this test in such a
way that the secondary considerations have subsumed the three-part test.
1. The CAFC increased the weight of secondary considerations
The CAFC rewrote the Supreme Court's Graham standard for obvi-
ousness by greatly increasing the value of the secondary considerations in
its analysis to the point that mere secondary considerations under Gra-
ham have become the primary decision-making factors in a court's obvi-
ousness analysis. The CAFC began transforming Graham's secondary
considerations into primary factors to consider in determining obvi-
ousness in W.L Gore & Associates v. Garlock, Inc. 170 The district court
stated that "'no amount of commercial success can save [the pat-
163. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 16, 26-28 (1989) (arguing that pro-patent CAFC's suggestion test is very
lenient test for combination patents).
164. Compare Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60-62
(1969) (holding that test for obviousness regarding combination patents is showing of synergis-
tic effects) with Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("A
requirement of 'synergism'... is nowhere to be found in the statute.").
165. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 145-64 and accompanying text.
167. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
168. Id at 17.
169. Id at 17-18.
170. 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984). Dr. Gore's inven-
tion, relating to a new method of treating polytetrafluorethylene, is more commonly known as
goretex. The district court held Dr. Gore's patent invalid owing to obviousness under § 103.
Id at 1546. The district court found the evidence of obviousness under Graham's three-part
test so overwhelming that secondary considerations were of no import. Id. at 1555. The
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ent].' "I7 The CAFC found this was an error and reversed the district
court's holding of obviousness based on the secondary considerations of
Graham.172 The CAFC cited such factors as the invention's satisfaction
of long-felt needs and commercial success. 173 The CAFC heightened the
importance of Graham's secondary considerations, stating that secon-
dary considerations "may be the most pertinent, probative, and revealing
evidence available to aid in reaching a conclusion on the obvious/nonob-
vious issue."'"7 The elevation of secondary considerations into factors of
primary importance was a dramatic thrust for the CAFC, considering
the court was less than one year old.1
7 5
The CAFC continued its systematic crusade to increase the weight
of secondary considerations in evaluating obviousness with its holding in
Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works.'7 6 The district court
stated "it is ... established that 'secondary considerations will not sup-
port a claim of invention if the subject-matter of the patent does not pass
the section 103 test of non-obviousness.' ",177 The CAFC agreed that the
invention was obvious according to Graham's three-part test. 178 How-
ever, finding extremely strong evidence of commercial success, the
CAFC reversed the district court's holding of obviousness.
179
The holding in Alco Standard Corp. v. TVA "'o demonstrates that
district courts, after having been consistently overturned by the CAFC
for applying the Supreme Court's Graham standard for obviousness, fi-
nally decided to apply the CAFC's view of obviousness. 8 ' In upholding
CAFC held that the district court was in error, declaring the patent valid, even though the
district court had followed the Supreme Court's Graham test. Id at 1555, 1559.




175. The CAFC was formed in 1982 and W.L Gore was decided in 1983.
176. 739 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985). The district court
held that the patent for a screw fastener for use in the manufacture of refrigerators was invalid
due to obviousness under § 103. Id at 1574. The district court had considered evidence of
secondary considerations but, following the Supreme Court's interpretation of Graham, stated
that a finding of obviousness under the three-part test cannot be overturned by secondary
considerations. Id. The CAFC disagreed with this interpretation of Graham and reversed.
Id. at 1574-78.
177. IdL at 1574.
178. Id. at 1575-76.
179. Id. at 1576.
180. 808 F.2d 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987). The district
court found that the plaintiff's patent for a method and apparatus for inspecting turbine rotors
was not obvious and therefore valid. Id at 1493.
181. Disregarding the Supreme Court's position, the district court followed what it must
have reasoned was the correct standard by performing a detailed secondary considerations
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the decision of the district court, the CAFC stated that the strong evi-
dence of secondary considerations was sufficient to outweigh the determi-
nation that the patent was obvious in light of the prior art.1" 2
Arguably, Congress was not satisfied with the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of § 103 in Graham, so it created the CAFC to ensure "pro-
patent" judicial rulings. The CAFC, as if to comply with congressional
orders, has elevated the importance of secondary considerations under
Graham- to the point that secondary considerations are sufficient to rebut
prima facie decisions of obviousness based on the prior art analysis. Con-
sequently, the CAFC has validated a number of patents that would have
been invalid under the Supreme Court's interpretation of Graham.18 3
The CAFC seems prepared to validate any patent on the issue of obvi-
ousness at the expense of overturning Supreme Court precedent. 184
2. The CAFC has expanded the range of secondary considerations
The CAFC expanded the types of secondary considerations relevant
to the question of obviousness while increasing the weight given to secon-
dary considerations. The forms of secondary considerations the CAFC
recognizes include: (1) the commercial success of the invention;185 (2)
analysis, which was enthusiastically described in great detail in the CAFC's affirmation. Id. at
1500-01.
182. Id at 1501. The CAFC stated: "This is one of those cases where evidence of secon-
dary considerations 'may... establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in
light of the prior art was not."' Id (quoting Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d
1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
183. See Alco Standard, 808 F.2d 1490; Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Simmons Fastener, 739 F.2d 1573; W.L Gore, 721 F.2d 1540; Stratoflex, Inc.
v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
In each of the above cases except Alco Standard, the district court followed the Supreme
Court's Graham analysis, which included analyzing evidence of secondary considerations
when merited. See Interconnect Planning, 774 F.2d at 1136-38; Simmons Fastener, 739 F.2d at
1574; WL. Gore,'721 F.2d at 1550; Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1535.
In each case-except Alco Standard, the CAFC criticized the district court for performing
an incomplete analysis and granting'insufficient weight to evidence of secondary considera-
tions. See Interconnect Planning, 774 F.2d at 1144; Simmons Fastener, 739 F.2d at 1574-75;
W.L. Gore, 721 F.2d at 1550; Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1538-39. The CAFC, in attempting to
modify district court behavior through positive and negative reinforcement in Alco Standard,
enthusiastically embraced the district court's detailed analysis of secondary considerations in
agreeing that the patent was not obvious and therefore valid. 808 F.2d at 1497-1501.
184. See supra note 183.
185. See, eg., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1573 (Fed. Cir.) (revers-
ing district court's holding that invention of plastic cable ties was obvious on' basis of secon-
dary considerations and stating that commercial success was evidenced by annual sales of $50
million), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987).
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the long-felt need for the invention;"8 6 (3) the failure of others to make
the invention;8 ' (4) disbelief of experts in the industry regarding the abil-
ity of the invention to perform as claimed;" 8 (5) copying of the invention
by competitors; 8 9 (6) successful licensing of the invention to competi-
tors;190 and (7) synergism, usually expressed by the CAFC as unexpected
results from combined prior art.' 9'
The CAFC has dramatically increased the role of secondary consid-
erations in the obviousness analysis.' 9z The breadth of the secondary
considerations analyzed seems to expand with each of the CAFC's deci-
sions.193 These secondary considerations, used repeatedly by the CAFC
186. See, e.g., W.L Gore, 721 F.2d at 1545 (reversing district court's finding of obviousness
based upon factors that included evidence of long-felt need for waterproof/breathable fabric).
187. See, eg., Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1531-32 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In Jones, the dis-
trict court found that patents covering the method and molds for casting concrete were invalid
based on obviousness under § 103. Id. at 1531. The CAFC reversed, stating that the district
court erred by failing to consider all relevant evidence, such as that which demonstrated the
new method met a critical need for an economical means of casting concrete that others in the
industry had been unable to provide. Id. at 1531-32.
188. See, eg., Burlington Indus. v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1581, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (affirming
district court's finding that method of reducing cotton dust in textile factories was nonobvious
because experts had strongly doubted that inventor's humidifier actually could reduce cotton
dust levels, calling it "completely unexpected breakthrough").
189. See, eg., Dow Chem. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 816 F.2d 617, 622-23 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987). In Dow Chemical, the CAFC affirmed the district
court's finding that a method of converting acrylonitrile to acrylamide was nonobvious. Id. at
622-23. One of the indicia of obviousness noted by the court was that American Cyanamid,
having tried and failed to develop the claimed method to produce the chemical compound in a
more efficient manner, elected to copy the method. Id. at 622. Therefore, the court con-
cluded, the method could not have been obvious or American Cyanamid would have been able
to re-create the method itself. Id.
190. See, eg., In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In Sernaker, the Patent &
Trademark Office (PTO) rejected a patent application for a method of manufacturing embroi-
dered emblems on the grounds that the invention was obvious under § 103. Id. at 990. The
CAFC reversed the finding of obviousness. Id The CAFC decided this case during its in-
fancy, when it was still determining how much weight it should grant Graham's secondary
considerations in an obviousness analysis. The CAFC stated that" 'secondary considerations'
... might be of possible utility in an obviousness determination." Id. at 996. The CAFC
determined that the PTO had erred in not considering evidence that the inventor had licensed
the invention to several competitors in the industry. Id.
191. See, eg., Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730
F.2d 1452, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (declaring evidence of unexpected results may be strong
support for conclusion that invention was not obvious). The district court found that a patent
for hydraulic scrap shears was invalid owing to obviousness under § 103. Id. at 1457. The
CAFC reversed, stating that the district court should have looked beyond evidence of commer-
cial success in determining obviousness. Id. at 1461. The court stated that although there was
no requirement to consider unexpected results under § 103, the CAFC had established that
such evidence may be considered. Id.
192. See discussion supra part IV.A.
193. See discussion supra part IV.B.
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to uphold the validity of a patent on the basis that the invention was
nonobvious, have eased the overall standard of patentability under § 103
and serve to increase the likelihood that a patent will be found valid.
C The CAFC as a De Novo Reviewer of Obviousness
In Graham the Supreme Court confirmed that the "ultimate ques-
tion of patent validity is one of law." 194 Under Graham's interpretation
of § 103, however, the district courts must perform several basic factual
inquiries in order to determine obviousness.1 95 Because a reviewing
court must make a detailed factual inquiry under Graham's three-part
test to determine obviousness on appeal, the issue arises as to how many
of the facts found by the district court are reviewable by the appellate
court.
Under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial
court is responsible for findings of fact. 96 This is due to the "public
interest in the stability and judicial economy" that is achieved by "recog-
nizing that the trial court, not the appellate tribunal, should be the finder
of facts." 197 Likewise, our society depends on appellate courts to review
findings of law and rectify misinterpretations of law by trial courts. A
trial court's findings of fact may not be set aside by an appellate court
unless the findings are clearly erroneous.1 98
Consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the CAFC
was expected to review only those facts found to lie within the clearly
erroneous standard.1 99 Expanding beyond its given role, the CAFC has,
in some cases, virtually retried the case at the appellate level, disregard-
ing the trial court's findings of fact.2 'o The CAFC reasoned that because
obviousness is a question of law, it may review any of the factual inquir-
194. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
195. Id
196. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
197. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) advisory committee's note accompanying 1985 amendment.
198. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
199. Herbert H. Goodman, The Effect of Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 Upon the
Patent Laws, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 233, 236 (1953). The codification of obviousness under
§ 103 was expected to have a stabilizing effect on patent law. The determination of obvi-
ousness would depend on the facts of each case. The findings of fact, unless clearly erroneous,
would be upheld by appellate courts. Therefore, "the effect of the new law should be that,
when a question of patentability has been passed on by a trial judge who has applied [§ 103],
an Appellate Court should affirm the trial court unless the trial court's finding of fact was
clearly erroneous." Id.
200. See, eg., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1569 (Fed. Cir.) (agree-
ing that Rule 52(a) applied and finding that § 103 determination of obviousness must be made
in light of all probative evidence, thus opening door to review all lower court findings of fact),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987).
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ies associated with the issue of obviousness.2"1 Hence, the CAFC is not
limited to reviewing only clearly erroneous findings of fact, as would be
expected under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.202
Therefore, the CAFC has not only changed the Supreme Court's stan-
dard of obviousness, but has made itself a de novo reviewer of obvi-
ousness by giving itself the authority to review all facts related to the
issue of obviousness in a case.
In sum, the CAFC no longer uses the clearly erroneous standard,
but instead appears to review the facts regarding obviousness whenever it
disagrees with the trial court. The CAFC often rolls up its sleeves and
reexamines all the facts of a case related to obviousness. 20 3 The CAFC
will affirm the district court's judgment if it agrees with its conclu-
sions, 2" reverse if it does not,205 and vacate and remand for new findings
if it determines the record lacks facts that are essential to an outcome it
prefers.20 6
D. The Impact of the Liberalization of Summary Judgment
A subtle factor that has given the CAFC greater authority over pat-
ent law is the Supreme Court's liberalization of the standard for granting
summary judgment.2 7 Historically, courts have been unwilling to em-
ploy summary judgment to terminate cases.208 Appellate courts have
discouraged trial courts from granting pre-trial summary judgment by
201. Id. at 1568-69.
202. Id. at 1569.
203. See, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044 (Fed. Cir.) (reversing
district court's holding of obviousness), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988). The district court
held that the defendant's patent for an air-deflecting device for reducing wind resistance en-
countered by tractor-trailer trucks was invalid owing to obviousness under § 103. Id. at 1048.
The CAFC reversed, stating that the district court failed to give proper weight to the secon-
dary considerations of long-felt need and failure of other attempts to fill this need. Id. at 1054.
204. See, e.g., Alco Standard Corp. v. TVA, 808 F.2d 1490, 1500-01 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (en-
thusiastically embracing district court's analysis of secondary considerations and finding that
invention was not obvious), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987).
205. See, eg., Uniroyal, 837 F.2d at 1054.
206. See, e.g., Gardner v. TEC Sys., Inc., 725 F.2d 1338 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
830 (1984). The district court held that plaintiff's patent for a device used in drying the ink
used on high-gloss papers found in magazines was invalid due to obviousness under § 103. Id.
at 1344. The CAFC vacated the district court's holding of obviousness because it felt that the
trial court did not properly evaluate the patent's claims. Id. at 1339 n.1.
207. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ("A party seeking to recover... may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action.., move with or without support-
ing affidavits for a summary judgment .... ").
208. See, eg., Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir.
1945) (stating that summary judgment, although valuable time-saving device, may actually
result in waste of time in cases in which summary judgment was improperly entered).
January 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
requiring trial judges to deny the motion if they have even "the slightest
doubt" whether summary judgment is appropriate.20 9 However, the in-
crease in the backlog on civil trial calendars in the United States over the
past few decades has prompted the Supreme Court to actively support
methods used to terminate cases before trial.210
The Supreme Court revitalized summary judgment procedure in
1986 with three decisions that liberalized the test for granting summary
judgment: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,21 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,212
and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 213 In these
cases the Supreme Court evinced a more favorable attitude toward dis-
charging cases on summary judgment.2"4 Since these Supreme Court de-
cisions there has been an increase in the percentage of cases in which
summary judgment motions were filed.215 The percentage of cases in
which the motions were granted is also on the rise.216 Consistent with
these results, at least one prominent commentator has declared that sum-
mary judgment will be easier to obtain in the future.217 Thus, the
Supreme Court, in Anderson, Celotex and Matsushita, directed that
courts may legitimately rely on summary judgment to decide cases.218
The liberalized standard for summary judgment may be viewed by
district courts as an excellent opportunity to shift patent cases to the
"experts" on the CAFC.21 9 In several cases district courts have dis-
209. Id. In Doehler the Second Circuit suggested that "trial judges should exercise great
care in granting motions for summary judgment." Id
210. See infra notes 211-20 and accompanying text.
211. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).'
212. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
213. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
214. See Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material
Change in Standards, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 770, 771 (1981) (stating these decisions "ap-
pear to signal somewhat of a turn toward greater approval of summary dispositions").
215. Joe E. Cecil, Trends in Summary Judgment Practice: A Summary of Findings, FJC,
Apr. 1991, at 11, 12-16.
216. See John E. Kennedy, Federal Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. Catrett
and Adickes v. Kress and the Evidentiary Problems Under Rule 56, 6 REv. Lri. 227, 254
(1987) (stating that "[o]n an overall rounded average of existing studies, one could make a
general estimate that the motion is made in five percent of cases; that over 509o are granted;
and of those appealed, that over 50% are affirmed").
217. See Steven A. Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the
Supreme Court, 6 Rlv. Lrrxo. 263, 283 (1987). In addition, the post-1986 decisions indicate
"many lower courts are getting the message" that the Supreme Court favors the expanded use
of summary judgment. Id. at 281.
218. See Deepwater Invs. Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1113 (10th Cir.
1991) (stating that any uncertainty in interpretation or use of summary judgment prior to 1986
was resolved by Supreme Court in "now-famous trilogy" of decisions).
219. The CAFC has reviewed 42 summary judgment decisions between 1982 and 1988.
Ronald B. Coolley, What the Federal Circuit Has Done and How Often: Statistical Study of the
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pensed with patent cases on their facts by granting summary judgment
on the issue of obviousness.
220
Although the Graham analysis is a legal analysis, it is also factually
rich. A district court may state that there are no issues of fact and grant
summary judgment on the legal issue of obviousness. 21 Under the
CAFC's view of appeals, however, the CAFC is permitted to revisit all
the facts regarding obviousness in order to ensure they were applied cor-
rectly by the district court z. 22  By granting summary judgment on the
issue of obviousness, the district court may clear its docket and deliver
both the legal issues and the findings of fact to the CAFC for review on
appeal.
District courts, encouraged by the preceding Supreme Court deci-
sions, have been more amenable to granting summary judgment. Mean-
while, the CAFC justified expandiig its authority to review trial court
findings of fact by asserting that Graham's three-part test mandated a
review of all facts relating to obviousness.223 This encouraged district
courts to grant summary judgment in patent litigation in order to remove
cumbersome patent litigation from their dockets, safe in the knowledge
that the CAFC could always revisit the facts on appeal. Accordingly,
when reviewing a summary judgment based on obviousness, the CAFC
may essentially reexamine the district court's findings of fact and func-
tion as a trial court. In those cases the CAFC acts as both a trier of fact
and as an appellate review panel.
V. THE CAFC HAS FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED PATENT LAW
WITHOUT AUTHORITY
The CAFC was created by Congress to help an overburdened
Supreme Court provide uniform interpretation of patent law among the
CAFCPatentDecisions-1982 to 1988, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 385, 397 (1989).
The author states that "summary judgments are becoming more common in patent litigation."
Id.; see Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Typifying the
extent to which district courts prefer to rely on the CAFC, Judge John F. Grady, writing for
the district court, stated: "'It gives me great comfort to know that I am just the first stop [in
this litigation]. Everything I have said here can be analyzed just as well by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.'" Id at 1579.
220. See, e.g., Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (review-
ing district court grant of summary judgment); Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Cumberland Corp.,
713 F.2d 774 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (same).
221. See, e.g., Interconnect Planning, 774 F.2d 1132; supra note 161.
222. See, e.g., Stratoffex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983); supra.note
153.
223. See, e.g., Stratoflex, 713 F.2d 1530; supra note 153.
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various circuit courts.224 Congress did not give the CAFC the authority
to overrule the Supreme Court. However, in the face of the CAFC's
significant modifications to patent law, neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court has acted to validate the CAFC's decisions.225 District courts,
tired of the CAFC overturning their decisions, have learned to follow the
law as interpreted by the CAFC rather than follow prior Supreme Court
decisions. Consequently, instead of simply assisting the Supreme Court
in unifying patent law, the CAFC has become the primary source for
patent law in the United States. The CAFC, however, lacks the Supreme
Court's constitutional authority and concomitant stability to serve as the
primary source for patent law.
A. There Is No Foundation for the CAFC's Rulings
Arguably, there is no reason for concern. The CAFC's rulings have
been neither validated nor invalidated by the Supreme Court or Con-
gress. Nonetheless, the law created by the CAFC has become increas-
ingly persuasive to lower courts. This influence stands to increase if
nothing is done to reverse the implicit authority granted the CAFC by a
disinterested Congress and Supreme Court.
The primary problem with maintaining the status quo is that the
CAFC's decisions do not have the force of law of the Supreme Court.226
By any legal measure, the CAFC is an intermediate court of appeals that
must adhere to the rulings of the Supreme Court. 27 There is no indica-
tion that either Congress or the Constitution gave the CAFC the power
to interpret patent law in the wake of the Supreme Court's silence. The
Supreme Court, as shown by its inaction in the development of patent
law since the creation of the CAFC, has recused itself from the develop-
ment of patent law.228
While the CAFC has unified the interpretation of patent law and
has eliminated forum shopping,2 29 it is unclear why, without Supreme
Court or congressional validation, the CAFC's new interpretation of pat-
ent law carries the same weight, or perhaps more weight, than contradic-
tory Supreme Court decisions. The foundation for CAFC decisions is
224. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
226. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
227. Id
228. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
229. See generally HARMON, supra note 86, at 73-80 (presenting obviousness from CAFC's




weak or even nonexistent, absent the backing of the Supreme Court or
codification by Congress.
B. The CAFC Is Susceptible to the Risks Inherent
in a Specialized Court
As discussed above, opponents of the CAFC argued against forma-
tion of the CAFC because it would be susceptible to the risks inherent in
specialized courts.230 The first argument cautioned that the quality of
decision making could suffer if specialized judges viewed cases from a
narrow perspective. 231 The quality of decision making in patent law has
suffered as evidenced by the myriad changes the CAFC has wrought in
patent law in the interpretation of obviousness, let alone in other areas.232
Moreover, decision making has suffered in that the CAFC has ignored
Supreme Court precedent and has continually overturned district court
decisions that were consistent with Supreme Court rulings regarding
obviousness.
The second argument against specialized courts focused on the con-
cern that judges of specialized courts might impose their own views of
policy, even in the face of higher court precedent to the contrary.233
CAFC judges have imposed their own policies with respect to obvi-
ousness by increasing the importance of secondary considerations in the
Graham analysis. 234 The CAFC also made a significant policy change
when it decided it had the authority, under Graham, to reexamine the
underlying facts of a case on appeal with respect to obviousness.235
These examples show that the CAFC is imposing its own policies, even
within areas normally governed by the Supreme Court and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The problems associated with the four remaining risks inherent in a
specialized court,236 although not yet apparent, loom on the horizon.
The quality of the appointments to the CAFC is at risk. When the
CAFC was formed, it inherited a team of bright, well-trained and techni-
230. See supra note 36 and accompanying text for the Hruska Commission's six disadvan-
tages of specialized courts.
231. See HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 30, at 28-30, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. at
234-36.
232. See supra part IV.
233. See HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 30, at 28-30, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. at
234-36.
234. See supra notes 170-82 and accompanying text.
235. See supra part IV.C.
236. See HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 30, at 28-30, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. at
234-36.
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cally-oriented judges from the U.S. Court of Claims and the U.S. Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA).23 7 As a result, the CAFC be-
gan with the best possible collection of judges available in the country.
But now virtually all these judges have retired and there is no longer a
"training ground," in the form of the CCPA, from which to promote
seasoned judges to the CAFC. Simultaneously, there is no source of dis-
trict court judges who have been trained in patent law. As a result, the
United States no longer has the same pool of highly capable, technically
qualified judges to promote to the CAFC as occurred when the CAFC
was first formed.238
C. The CAFC Has the Same Weaknesses as the
Abolished Commerce Court
The CAFC has some of the same weaknesses that led to the failure
of the Commerce Court.239 The Commerce Court's demise in 1913 was
attributed to a lack of support from the parties subject to its review and
the public's lack of respect for it as a federal court.2' The CAFC, unlike
the Commerce Court, does not have a few exclusive interests to which it
must respond. In fact, the opposite is true. The competing branches of
government, as well as large corporations, monitor the manner and poli-
cies employed by the CAFC as it makes decisions that go to the heart of
237. House Hearings on HR. 2405, supra note 44, at 1.
238. The original quality of the appointments to the CAFC must suffer as current CAFC
judges retire. Future judges are not likely to have the same vision and focus provided by the
original CAFC. This may result in a return to confusion in the interpretation of patent law as
the unified message of the CAFC is broken by dissent and discord. Therefore, lacking a com-
petent source of judges experienced in patent law from which to draw, the CAFC may some-
day be populated with judges who lack the experience of their highly-skilled predecessors.
Exemplifying the risk associated with a CAFC populated with inexperienced judges, in
the summer of 1992 two separate three-judge panels of the CAFC issued contradictory opin-
ions regarding product-by-process claims, a type of patent used extensively in the biotechnol-
ogy fields. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1991); Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir.
1992). Donald Dunner, a prominent Washington, D.C., patent lawyer, stated that the CAFC
had "always been committed to providing uniformity" but that these two conflicting decisions
do not "foster that goal." Susan Kostal, Schism Is Threatening Patent Court's Reliability, S.F.
DAILY J., Sept. 11, 1992, at 7. Another expert in patent law, Donald Chisum, stated that "the
real issue is what to do with a court who says one year the rule is black and the next year the
rule is white" because conflicting decisions from the same court "threaten the stability of [pat-
ent] law." Id The strong differences in opinion between the two three-judge panels were
attributed to a CAFC undergoing a difficult change due to the lack of experience of its newer
judges. Id. Louis J. Knobbe, a name partner at a patent law firm, argued that this problem
was the result of the continued change in the level of experience on the CAFC, specifically, "as
the number of [judges experienced in patent law] decreases" on the CAFC. Id.
239. See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
240. See Dix, supra note 54, at 239; supra part II.C.
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U.S. manufacturing and technology interests.241 Currently, most parties
appear satisfied with the CAFC because the CAFC has successfully clari-
fied and stabilized the interpretation of patent law.242
The CAFC, like the Commerce Court, however, is a court of narrow
subject matter jurisdiction and has expanded its scope of review beyond
typically appellate issues, such as findings of fact. As a result, the CAFC
has some of the structural weaknesses of the late Commerce Court.
The failure of the Commerce Court suggests that a federal court
requires three characteristics in order to maintain its institutional
strength and inherent judicial immunity: (1) The behavior and technique
of the judges must reflect an impression of impartiality and indifference
to political influence; (2) the court must demonstrate its independence
from the executive and legislative branches by applying established law;
and (3) the court should appear integrated into a homogeneous federal
court system.
243
The CAFC fails the last two of the above lessons taught by the fail-
ure of the Commerce Court. First, the CAFC has not been applying
established law.2' Second, as a court with narrow subject matter juris-
diction, the CAFC is not integrated into the federal court system. This
lack of integration is further exhibited by the CAFC's willful rejection of
existing Supreme Court precedent.245 Lacking the foundation of a
proper federal court, in a time of patent law crisis, the CAFC could be
phased out as quickly as it was created.
The CAFC's weaknesses may culminate in its eventual demise. De-
cisions limiting patentability, made by future, less experienced judges
could cause Congress and business interests to question the utility of the
CAFC. As the CAFC comes under fire, its lack of integration into the
federal court system will make it particularly vulnerable. The CAFC's
weakness is compounded by its failure to observe previous Supreme
Court precedent.246 As a result, opponents may proclaim that the CAFC
is a rogue court which must be eliminated to stop the foundationless cre-
ation of patent law in order to protect one of the key underpinnings of
U.S. commerce.
241. See 1 PATENT PREPARATION & PROSECUTION PRACTIcE, supra note 41, at 1-2 (stat-
ing "[a]n effective patent system, by ensuring orderly protection of technological innovation,
offers incentive for creative individuals to expend their time, energy and money in the process
of inventing and, therefore, is a vital part of modern industrialized life").
242. HARMON, supra note 86, at 299.
243. See Dix, supra note 54, at 260.
244. See supra part IV.A-B.
245. See supra part IV.A-B.
246. See supra part IV.A-B.
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D. Two Possible Solutions
There are two possible solutions to the problems resulting from the
lack of validation of CAFC decisions by either the Supreme Court or
Congress. First, Congress can remove the CAFC's jurisdiction. Unfor-
tunately this solution leaves the underlying patent law in the same condi-
tion as before the creation of the CAFC. Patent practitioners would
return to forum shopping, litigation costs would increase, and uncer-
tainty concerning patentability among inventors and manufacturers
would climb. Abolishing the CAFC would undesirably send patent law
into another period of uncertainty and disarray.
Instead of abolishing the CAFC, Congress could modify the
CAFC's jurisdiction to ensure that the Supreme Court affirms or rejects
each CAFC decision. Under this modified grant of jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court would take positive control of the CAFC. This approach
would allow the CAFC to continue its role as the primary source of U.S.
patent law, which is necessary because the CAFC has created an exten-
sive body of law that has greatly increased the stability of patent law.2 47
At the same time, the modified jurisdiction would force the Supreme
Court to provide an express ruling either affirming or rejecting the
CAFC's departures from Supreme Court precedent. Consequently, mod-
flying the CAFC's jurisdiction would eliminate the implied authority of
the CAFC and replace it with express Supreme Court authority. There-
fore, the proper solution is to modify the CAFC's jurisdiction to ensure
that the Supreme Court reasserts its authority in patent law by forcing it
to affirm or reject the CAFC's decisions.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT MUST REASSERT ITS AUTHORITY IN
PATENT LAW
One of the primary reasons Congress created the CAFC was to pro-
vide a national, appellate forum that would resolve patent disputes in a
uniform manner.248 Congress did not intend to create a "second"
Supreme Court for patent law issues.249 However, the Supreme Court
has allowed the CAFC to act as the primary source of patent law by
remaining relatively silent in patent law cases. 25' The Supreme Court's
silence has allowed the CAFC to make increasingly radical departures
247. See 1 PATENT PREPARATION & PROSECUTION PRACTICE, supra note 41, at 5-19
("[T]he CAFC made a full 80% of all patent issues reasonably predictable and ascer-
tainable.").
248. See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
249. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
250. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 26:455
THE CAFC UNCHECKED
from earlier Supreme Court precedent in interpreting the standard of ob-
viousness. The CAFC has changed the standard of review for combina-
tion patent cases that the Supreme Court established and followed. The
CAFC, in reinterpreting the Supreme Court's holding in Graham v. John
Deere Co. ,"', also rejected the view that Graham consists of a three-part
test in which secondary considerations "may have relevancy."2" 2 The
Supreme Court's silence has allowed the CAFC to elevate the impor-
tance of secondary considerations to a level equal in weight to the three-
part Graham standard.
Such concerns can be ignored, at least temporarily, because all par-
ties, including the Supreme Court, have remained silent and noncon-
frontational, thus implying they are satisfied with the CAFC's
performance. However, if and when the Supreme Court decides to "cor-
rect" years of CAFC interpretations of patent law, either to correct a
misguided CAFC or to fill the void left by the abolished CAFC, there
will be havoc. The Supreme Court must reassert its authority in patent
law cases to either confirm or reject the body of law which the CAFC has
created to eliminate the possibility of any extreme "correction" that
could eviscerate years of patent law development.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress and the Supreme Court have worked in tandem to create a
powerful authority in patent law-the CAFC. There is no argument
over the results the CAFC has achieved. The CAFC's most important
goal was to develop a uniform patent law to guide all the district courts
without burdening the Supreme Court.25 3 The CAFC has developed pat-
ent law at a frenetic pace, unencumbered by the Supreme Court. Unfor-
tunately, as evidenced by its performance in the area of interpreting the
standard of obviousness, the CAFC is creating law that contradicts
Supreme Court decisions. The situation is critical because district courts
now follow the CAFC's decisions. The CAFC does not have the same
authority to create supreme law as does the Supreme Court. Therefore,
when the Supreme Court remains reticent in the face of contrary CAFC
decisions, there is uncertainty as to the true direction of the law. The
Supreme Court must affirm or reject the CAFC's departures in patent
251. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
252. Id at 17-18.
253. HARMON, supra note 86, at 299.
January 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
law made by the CAFC to ensure a solid foundation for U.S. patent law
and U.S. commerce.
Robert Desmond*
* I dedicate this Comment to my parents Robert and Bea Desmond, my Aunt Helen and
my fiancee Majorie. I would also like to thank Professor John T. McDermott for his insight.
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